The concept of mind has long occupied a central place in philosophical inquiry, yet it remains both deeply familiar and profoundly elusive. Traditional approaches have often treated the mind as an inner, private, and substantial entity, distinct from the body and the external world. This paper examines Ludwig Wittgenstein’s contribution to the philosophy of mind within the analytic tradition, focusing on his critique of Cartesian dualism and introspective accounts of mental phenomena. Through an analysis of his early and later works; particularly TractatusLogico-Philosophicus, Philosophical Investigations, and the Blue and Brown Books, the paper explores Wittgenstein’s view that philosophical confusion about the mind arises largely from the misuse of language. Central to this discussion is Wittgenstein’s distinction between the uses of ‘I’ as subject and ‘I’ as object, his private language argument, and his claim that certain first-person mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification. The paper also examines Wittgenstein’s proposal for the elimination of the pronoun ‘I’ in the expression of immediate experience, highlighting his rejection of the notion of the mind as an inner entity. Ultimately, Wittgenstein conceives the mind not as a metaphysical substance but as a set of activities embedded in language, social practices, and the world itself. By situating the mind within shared forms of life, Wittgenstein offers a non-dualistic, anti-Cartesian account of mentality that dissolves traditional philosophical problems rather than attempting to solve them.
